

Spying—A Growth Industry

By Tad Szulc

For some time now, espionage has become a growth industry in Washington, with a cast of thousands of visible and invisible operatives working for scores of governments.

In Washington, there are the CIA operations centered at Langley under the director of Central Intelligence, currently Admiral Stansfield Turner. The CIA is undergoing a controversial reorganization, and much of its former paramilitary role overseas has been taken over by the Pentagon. But the CIA still involves itself in the politics of other countries.

Although such activities are supposed to be limited and conducted only with the knowledge of congressional oversight committees, there are reasons to believe — and this information had not surfaced publicly at the time of this writing — that CIA-supplied funds were used against the French Communist party during the French election campaign earlier this year. At home the CIA's counterintelligence staff is charged with protecting American secrets, among other things.

Besides the CIA, the U.S. intelligence community includes the super-secret National Security Agency headquartered in Fort Meade, Md., it is in charge of satellite observations, electronics monitoring of worldwide military communications and other communications of interest, and the making and break-



ing of codes. Also included are the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, the Air Force's National Reconnaissance Office for its part in the spy-in-the-sky satellite program, and the FBI in its counterintelligence role.

Aside from subversive operations abroad, the intelligence community's principal responsibility is the collection of foreign intelligence, both overtly and covertly. The government cannot make major policy decisions without this flow of intelligence, whether it pertains to Soviet or Chinese strategic developments, changes in the character of foreign regimes, foreign political trends, Soviet grain crops, or the projected world petroleum supply.

To obtain all these data the Washington-directed espionage machine must depend on electronic means as well as on human agents. During the Watergate investigations, for example, it developed that the National Security Agency and the

Army, Navy, and Air Force units associated with it had been intercepting secret diplomatic traffic between foreign embassies in Washington and their home offices. (Not to be outdone, the Russians are believed to have found ways of breaking into the U.S. government's domestic microwave transmissions.)

Of course, however sophisticated electronic espionage may become, human agents — collectively called HUMINT — will probably continue to dominate intelligence gathering, because satellites and decoding computers cannot make judgments about whether others' intentions are hostile or not, nor can they produce counterintelligence on enemy agents.

It takes human agents to infiltrate foreign governments and intelligence services and to guard against penetration by "unfriendlylies." This is the most vital and secret function of the American intelligence communi-

ty. At Langley and elsewhere plans are continuously made to insert American agents — or American-controlled foreign nationals — into foreign governments at every level.

There are situations in which electronic spying blends into espionage by human agents. Every form of spying complements another form. Thus a 23-year-old former CIA employee named William T. Kampiles was arrested and indicted last August for selling to the Russians a top-secret manual that described the workings of a vital United States satellite, a satellite that photographs Soviet nuclear missile emplacements as part of verification procedures under the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement.

There are administration officials who believe that this act of espionage has compromised U.S. strategic verification techniques, a major blow against American defenses.

What hasn't been explained, however, is how a junior CIA official had unlimited access to such a top-secret document. It may have been an inexcusable security breakdown, but some intelligence people have been mumbling about a KGB penetration. Other sensitive materials are also believed to be missing, and president Carter personally took the CIA to task for these problems.

TOMORROW: the Russian advantage

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